In Schmidt v. Coogan, 181 Wn.2d 661, 671, 335 P.3d 424 (2014), the Washington Supreme Court set broad outlines for emotional distress damages as a part of a legal malpractice claim:
“We hold that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice case may recover emotional distress damages when significant emotional distress is foreseeable from the sensitive or personal nature of the representation or when the attorney’s conduct is particularly egregious. However, simple malpractice resulting in pecuniary loss that causes emotional upset does not support emotional distress damages.”
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals in Seattle recently applied that standard in the context of asserted malpractice arising from bankruptcy representation. Echols v. Lee, 2024 WL 21406 (Wn. App. Jan. 2, 2024) (unpublished), involved the alleged failure to include real estate and related mortgages in a bankruptcy petition. Although the bankruptcy was later reopened by subsequent counsel to address the property involved, the client alleged his original lawyer had committed malpractice and the client had suffered emotional distress as a result. The trial court granted summary judgment on the emotional distress damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. In doing so, the Court of Appeals began—and largely ended—its analysis with the Supreme Court’s standard from Schmidt v. Coogan. The Court of Appeals noted that the bankruptcy involved real property and associated liens rather than anything “sensitive or personal.” The Court of Appeals also found that there was no evidence in the record of egregious or intentional conduct by the lawyer. Absent either trigger, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the emotional distress damages could not stand.
While not plowing any new legal ground, Echols offers both a useful survey of the law in this area and a pointed reminder of the relatively narrow circumstances when emotional distress damages may be included in a legal malpractice claim.
